Facts
```json { "title": \"Dismissal of appeal against the declaration of invalidity of a testamentary disposition", \"facts": \"Parties:
Appellant: [A.]
Respondents: [B.] , [C.] , [D.] , [E.] , [F.] , [G.] , [H.] , [I.] , [J.] , [K.] , [L.] , [M.] , [N.] , [O.] , [P.] , [Q.]
Facts:
[A.R.] (testator) appointed [A.] in his will dated March 14, 2002 to a share of 1/16 as heir. The testator had already determined in an earlier will dated October 8, 1999 that his entire estate was subject to Norwegian law. The testator had been incapable of action and testamentary capacity due to a progressive dementia since August 2005 and died on July 7, 2009 in Spain. The testamentary dispositions were submitted to the Probate Office of Appenzell Innerrhoden on July 15, 2009 and communicated to the heirs.
On October 21, 2009, the respondents filed a mediation request with the Mediation Office against [A.] . After the mediation attempt failed, they filed a lawsuit with the District Court of Appenzell I.Rh. on January 5, 2010, in which they applied for the invalidity of the testamentary disposition of March 14, 2002 to the extent that [A.] was appointed or favored as heir. The defendant applied for the dismissal of the lawsuit.
The District Court ordered a hearing of evidence and declared the testamentary disposition invalid. The appeal of the defendant was dismissed by the Cantonal Court. The appellant then filed an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court, in which he applied for the annulment of the cantonal decision and the referral of the proceedings back to the lower court.
The contested decision of the last cantonal instance concerns a civil matter of property law and is thus subject to review by the Federal Supreme Court. The appeal is admissible, as the value in dispute threshold pursuant to Art. 74 para. 1 lit. b FSCA is met and the appeal was filed in time.
The appeal to the Federal Supreme Court is a reformatory remedy that requires an application in the matter. The appellant requests, as the main application, the referral of the proceedings back to the lower court. The reformatory applications are only made eventually, which generally does not suffice to replace a reformatory main application. However, a main application for referral may suffice if the Federal Supreme Court could not decide itself in the event of an admission.
In the ordinary appeal proceedings, all complaints pursuant to Art. 95 f. FSCA are admissible. Since this is a matter of property law, it cannot be complained that the foreign law applicable under Swiss international private law has not been correctly applied. The party seeking legal redress can only assert that the contested decision applies foreign law arbitrarily or violates other constitutional rights.
The Federal Supreme Court applies the law ex officio and decides with free cognition. However, it is not obliged to examine all legal questions arising on its own initiative if the appellant no longer raises them. The appeal must concisely state in what respect the contested act violates the law. The appellant must address the contested decision and show where a violation of federal law lies. The strict principle of complaint applies to submissions concerning the violation of constitutional rights.
With regard to the facts, the Federal Supreme Court bases its judgment on the findings of the lower court. In this respect, the party seeking legal redress can only submit that the findings of the lower court are obviously incorrect or are based on another violation of the law within the meaning of Art. 95 FSCA. In the appeal, it must also be shown in what way the correction of the complained deficiencies can be decisive for the outcome of the proceedings.
The dispute initially revolves around the territorial jurisdiction of the court seized. The Cantonal Court recalls the decision of September 24, 2013, with which the District Court examined and dismissed the plea of lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 152 para. 1 of the Innerrhoden Law on the Code of Civil Procedure. This decision has formally become final, and no significant new facts regarding international jurisdiction have been asserted. The private legal opinion of Prof. Dr. [W.] of May 19, 2017 does not qualify as new evidence. Even in the light of the perpetuatio fori principle, the District Court had no reason to revisit the decision of September 24, 2013. A violation of the right to be heard cannot be seen in this.
The contested decision is based on two (alternative) grounds, each of which could have terminated the legal dispute before the lower court: on the one hand, the appellant is said to have established the jurisdiction of the District Court by pleading pursuant to Art. 6 PILA, on the other hand, the District Court is said to be the court competent pursuant to Art. 86 para. 1 PILA at the last place of residence of the testator. In view of this multiple justification, the appeal to the Federal Supreme Court must demonstrate that each of them violates the law. If only one of the grounds of the lower court proves to be in conformity with federal law, the contested decision remains.
The thesis that the dispute over the appellant's status as heir involves a status question is not convincing. The concept of a property law dispute in Art. 6 PILA corresponds in content to that of the property law claim as used in Art. 5 para. 1 PILA concerning the jurisdiction agreement. Disputes over inheritance claims are of a property law nature, and the jurisdiction of the Swiss court seized can also be established by a pleading within the meaning of the cited provision. The lower court's finding that the property law aspect outweighs any effects of the status as heir is not misplaced.
The argument that a pleading is excluded because the testator in the will of October 8, 1999 made an explicit choice of jurisdiction in favor of the Norwegian courts and authorities is doomed to fail. The Cantonal Court establishes as undisputed that the testator thereby subjected his entire estate and thus also the contested appointment of heir of March 14, 2002 to Norwegian law. The appellant does not assert that he relied in the cantonal proceedings on the said will or on the alleged choice of jurisdiction contained therein to justify why a pleading would have been excluded, and that he was not heard by the Cantonal Court in this respect.
The claim that the pleading is invalid and thus ineffective due to a lack of intent is also unfounded. The appellant asserts vague and misleading statements by the respondents without providing concrete explanations. The appeal in this respect is not sufficiently substantiated, and the Federal Supreme Court does not have to express itself on the question of whether a deception discovered subsequently could stand in the way of the validity of a pleading.
After all, the lower court's finding remains that the appellant pleaded before the District Court within the meaning of Art. 6 PILA by responding to the lawsuit on January 22, ``` The appellant does not claim that, in the cantonal proceedings, he relied on the aforementioned will or the alleged choice of jurisdiction contained therein to justify why a statement of defense was excluded, and that he was not heard by the Cantonal Court on this matter. The assertion that the statement of defense is invalid and thus ineffective due to a lack of intent is also unfounded. The appellant alleges false and misleading statements by the respondents without providing concrete explanations. The appeal on this point is not sufficiently substantiated, and the Federal Supreme Court does not need to address the question of whether a subsequently discovered deception would preclude the effectiveness of a statement of defense. After all, the previous instance's finding that the appellant, in the sense of Art. 6 PILA, entered an appearance in the proceedings before the District Court by expressly acknowledging the international jurisdiction of the court called upon in his response to the complaint of November 22, 2010, remains unchanged. The objections raised by the appellant against this are unfounded. The challenged decision stands on this basis. Therefore, considerations regarding those parts of the appeal in which the appellant objects to the District Court also being competent under Art. 86 para. 1 PILA are superfluous. To the extent that the appellant insists on not entering an appearance on the complaint, his appeal is unfounded. In the matter at hand, the dispute is whether the testamentary disposition of March 14, 2002, by which the testator appointed the appellant as heir to a share of 1/16, falls away pursuant to § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG. The testator had provided in his last will of October 8, 1999, that his estate is subject to Norwegian law. The previous instance adopts the findings of the SIR expert opinion, according to which § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG is intended for cases in which the circumstances change so radically after the creation of the will that it is obvious that the testator's intent would not be realized if the will were maintained. The previous instance notes that the testator and the appellant were connected by a long friendship and that the testator had appointed the appellant as trustee in various trusts. The appellant was instructed to hold [TT.] accountable and to recover the invested funds. Between September 1998 and March 2002, the testator made seven payments to the appellant totaling approximately USD 350,000. The cantonal authorities assume that the appellant was already compensated by payments made between 1998 and 2002 and that, taking into account the payments made in 2006 and 2007, he had received too much. By having USD 208,722.47 transferred to him in breach of agreement and without legal basis, as well as without the knowledge of the testator and settlor or the authorized representative, the appellant, in an objective sense, created a circumstance within the meaning of § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG. The appellant maintains that the first-instance decision, with reference to § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG, lacks any explanation of the criteria set out therein and instead simply repeats the foreign legal text. The existence of the circumstances and the undoubted amendment of the will by the testator are central issues in the present dispute. However, an examination of these issues did not take place in the first-instance proceedings. The appellant sees in this a serious violation of the right to be heard, which could not be remedied in the appeal proceedings. The previous instance acknowledges that the first-instance considerations regarding the regulatory content of § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG, the applicable standard of proof, and the SIR expert opinion were rather brief. However, the first-instance judgment clearly shows that the District Court considered the allegations made against the appellant to be established and assessed them individually as legally sufficient circumstances within the meaning of § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG. The extensive appeal reasoning demonstrates that the appellant was sufficiently informed about the grounds for the decision. To comply with the requirements of Art. 29 para. 2 Cst., the authority does not need to address all points in detail, nor does it need to refute each individual submission. Whether the affected person can be informed about the scope of an administrative decision and challenge it in full knowledge of the matter is assessed based on the result of the decision, which is expressed in the judgment and which alone affects the legal status of the affected person. The reasoning is therefore not to be measured against itself, but against the legal ruling. The appellant cannot explain before the Federal Supreme Court why he could not have recognized at all why the District Court upheld the opposing complaint and declared the last will of March 14, 2002, regarding his appointment as heir or beneficiary to be invalid, nor does he wish to comment on the previous instance's finding that he had not concretely presented this in his appeal. With the allegation that the first-instance decision, in violation of Art. 16 PILA, lacks any examination of § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG and that the previous instance, by not finding this, also violates Art. 16 PILA, the appellant is not to be heard due to a lack of material exhaustion of the cantonal instances. The party seeking legal redress must address in the appeal to the Federal Supreme Court the considerations of the last cantonal instance regarding the objections that they had already raised before this last cantonal instance. They may not withhold the legally relevant objections of the previous instance known to them in order to raise them only after the issuance of an unfavorable decision in the subsequent appeal proceedings. Regarding the proof of the circumstances that the revocation of a testamentary disposition under § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG requires, the appellant complains that the previous instance leaves unclear what standard of proof it is applying. It states that the existence of circumstances must be proven beyond doubt or with near certainty and points out that this corresponds to a standard of proof of around 80% according to part of the doctrine. This implies that the Cantonal Court, in fact, considers a standard of proof of only 80% to be sufficient. At the same time, it states that § 57 para. 2 sentence 2 NEG is an exception that must be narrowly and restrictively interpreted, which per se contradicts a standard of proof of 80%. The SIR expert opinion also states that the circumstance must have such a high degree of probability that it is certain. If the previous instance were to be satisfied with a standard of proof of 80%, it would contradict itself and act arbitrarily and would also violate Art. 16 PILA because it would have disregarded the SIR expert opinion and not applied Norwegian law as a Norwegian court would. The concerns of the appellant are unfounded. She argues that the existence of such circumstances must be proven beyond doubt or with near certainty, and points out that this corresponds to a standard of proof of around 80% according to part of the doctrine. The Cantonal Court thereby implies that a standard of proof of only 80% would suffice in fact. At the same time, it states that § 57 Abs. 2 Satz 2 NEG is an exception that must be interpreted narrowly and restrictively, which per se contradicts a standard of proof of 80%. The SIR expert opinion also states that the circumstance must have such a high degree of probability that it is certain. If the lower court were to be satisfied with a standard of proof of 80%, it would contradict itself and act arbitrarily, and would also violate Art. 16 PILA by disregarding the SIR expert opinion and not applying Norwegian law as a Norwegian court would. The complainant's concerns are unfounded. The challenged decision is based on the finding that strict standards must be applied to the proof of circumstances within the meaning of § 57 Abs. 2 Satz 2 NEG, and that a significantly stricter standard of proof applies to the factual requirements of this provision, unlike the mere preponderance of probability known as the standard of proof under Norwegian civil procedural law. According to the lower court, it must first be determined whether, as a matter of fact, it is beyond doubt or with near certainty that the complainant has created circumstances within the meaning of Art. § 57 Abs. 2 Satz 2 NEG after the creation of the will. The challenged decision does indeed mention a part of the doctrine according to which a standard of proof of around 80% should be assumed. However, the complaint does not provide any concrete indications that the lower court based its findings of fact on this opinion, nor is this apparent. Furthermore, the complainant does not address the question of what higher standard of proof would be decisive for the creation of circumstances within the meaning of § 57 Abs. 2 Bst. b NEG. He also does not claim that Norwegian civil procedural law requires a standard of proof of absolute certainty in the sense of a probability of 100%. With his mere assumptions, the complainant cannot demonstrate a violation of federal law. Furthermore, the complainant refers to his argument that, under Norwegian law, in the case of an allegation of a criminal offense, as raised by the respondents, a criminal conviction or at least a comparable degree of certainty must be present for the circumstance within the meaning of § 57 Abs. 2 Satz 1 NEG to be sufficiently certain. The lower court remains silent on why a criminal conviction is not necessary, even though a criminal offense is alleged against the complainant and he has demonstrated that mere suspicion and a civil conviction are insufficient, and even a criminal conviction did not suffice according to the case mentioned in the SIR expert opinion. Thus, the Cantonal Court violates the duty to state reasons in a decisive point. It applies the law in an arbitrary and distorting manner, not as the foreign judge would, thereby violating Art. 16 PILA. Furthermore, it disregards the findings of the SIR expert opinion without reason, which is equivalent to an arbitrary evaluation of evidence. The allegations are unfounded. In connection with the discussion of which facts can be considered as circumstances within the meaning of § 57 Abs. 2 Satz 2 NEG, the Cantonal Court makes it clear that there does not have to be a criminal conviction against the complainant and that circumstances of a lesser nature are sufficient for the application of the provision in question. The complainant does not demonstrate in what way the lower court thereby misinterprets the requirements of Norwegian law and applies § 57 Abs. 2 Satz 2 NEG in an almost arbitrary manner. He also does not indicate in what way the lower court, in the course of establishing the facts, decisively relied on the fact that his behavior, as established by it, could be criminally relevant according to the alleged opinion of the respondents. Thus, the complainant fails to explain why it should be decisive for the outcome of the proceedings whether § 57 Abs. 2 Satz 2 NEG, in connection with the allegation of criminal behavior, requires a corresponding criminal conviction. However, no interest worthy of protection within the meaning of Art. 76 FSCA can exist in the clarification of questions without practical relevance. In this respect, the complaint is not to be entered into. Next, the complainant accuses the lower court of arbitrarily ignoring all indications that it was not clear between him and the testator that the previous payments in the years 1998 to 2002 were to be credited to the success bonus according to the agreement of 21 April 1998. With its conclusion that the alleged creditability was certain for both parties, the lower court also applies Norwegian law arbitrarily. According to the challenged decision, there is no sufficient indication of any possible obligation to credit the payments of 22 September 2000, 13 December 2001 and 20 March 2003. By nevertheless concluding that both parties assumed the creditability of the advance payments, the lower court contradicts itself and evaluates the evidence arbitrarily in a decisive point. As far as the last-mentioned allegation is concerned, the complainant's view is too short-sighted. The Cantonal Court deals in detail with the seven payments and the corresponding instructions and notes. It explains why, in any case, the payment instructions for USD 150,000 (3 September 1998) and USD 100,000 (9 October 1999), the assumption of the costs for the complainant's ship trip of USD 15,980 in July 1999 and the receipted cash payments of USD 9,160 and GBP 8,000 on 28 April 2000 were understood by both parties as advance payments and were credited against the success bonus of 20% agreed in writing on 21 April 1998. Regarding the payments of 22 September 2000, 13 December 2001 and 20 March 2002, the lower court notes that the complainant acknowledged the connection with the TT matter during the first-instance main hearing, but that there is no sufficient indication of any possible obligation to credit according to the required standard of proof of near certainty. The challenged decision concludes that the testator's payment notes up to April 2000 clearly indicate an obligation to credit the received payments against the agreed success fee. The complainant fails to demonstrate in what way this conclusion is contradictory and it is also not apparent. Otherwise, the complainant has nothing substantial to counter these considerations. The complainant does not claim that, in the course of its finding that there was no legal basis for the payments in the years 2006 and 2007 in the amount of USD 208,722.47 from the client account of the law firm [T.] , the lower court also took into account the payments made after 28 April 2000. Subsequently, the complainant refers to various reasons that would speak against the crediting of the seven payments from 1998 to 2002 and that were arbitrarily disregarded by the lower court. The contested decision states that the testator's payment notes up to April 2000 clearly indicate an obligation to offset the received payments against the agreed success fee. The appellant fails to explain how this conclusion could be contradictory and it is not apparent. Moreover, the appellant has nothing substantial to counter these considerations. The appellant does not claim that the lower court, in its finding that there was no legal basis for the payments made in 2006 and 2007 amounting to USD 208,722.47 from the client trust account of the law firm [T.] , also considered the payments made after April 28, 2000. Subsequently, the appellant raises various reasons why the seven payments made between 1998 and 2002 should not be offset and were arbitrarily disregarded by the lower court. The main objection is that the testator had unconditionally allowed the agreement of April 21, 1998 to continue, even though the payments made from 1998 to 2002 exceeded the maximum expected success premium. The appellant counters the lower court's consideration that his collection efforts were still ongoing at the time and there was no reason to revisit the compensation agreement with his cantonal submissions and various file references. The conclusion of the cantonal court that the testator in case TT had expected repayments of USD 2 million is alleged to be contrary to the file and arbitrary. As evident from the memorandum of the American law firm dated November 7, 2000, it was already known in the year 2000 that USD 2 million could not be expected. Instead, there was always talk of an expected sum of USD 1.5 million, corresponding to a success premium of USD 300,000. The most significant factor is the clear and meticulous character of the testator. Therefore, it is inconceivable that the testator, after reaching the expected maximum amount, made further payments without comment and fully maintained the success premium agreement. It is also undisputed that the testator was averse to advance payments. All this is left unconsidered by the lower court. The appellant's argument is thus based on the thesis that the testator in case TT expected no more than USD 1.5 million and had already paid out the corresponding success premium of USD 300,000 in the year 2000. The fact that the testator allowed the agreement of April 21, 1998 to continue and triggered payments…