Facts

The Regional Employment Centre (AOO) Gelterkinden suspended the respondent (born 1982) from entitlement by decision of 25 June 2019 due to refusal of reasonable work for 32 days. The Office for Industry, Trade and Labour (KIGA) Basel-Landschaft dismissed the objection by decision on objection of 29 November 2019.

The Cantonal Court of Basel-Landschaft set aside the decision on objection by judgment of 12 June 2020. KIGA Basel-Landschaft filed an appeal in public law matters with the Federal Supreme Court and requested that the cantonal judgment be set aside and the suspension be confirmed, alternatively that the number of suspension days be adjusted, and subsidiarily that a sanction under Art. 30 para. 1 lit. c UIA be examined.

The background was placement through [B. AG] (placement officer [C.] ). In e-mails of 1 and 19 April 2019, the respondent expressed preferences for a position in the social sector rather than as a landscape gardener, showed impatience regarding appointment information, and wrote that he would not work at certain companies 'for all the money in the world'. No concrete job offer or employment contract existed. The placement did not materialise.

The lower court denied the elements of Art. 30 para. 1 lit. d UIA for lack of a concrete job offer and whether it would have been reasonable. The appellant acknowledged the absence of a concrete offer but complained of an incorrect interpretation as a catch-all provision and as a provision addressing endangerment. The question at issue was whether the suspension had been lawfully lifted.

Considerations

Under Art. 17 paras. 1 and 3 UIA, the insured person must undertake everything reasonable to avoid or shorten unemployment. Breaches of these obligations are sanctioned through suspensions under Art. 30 UIA, which constitute a limitation of liability and are subject to the principles of legality, proportionality and culpability. Art. 30 para. 1 lit. d UIA covers, as a catch-all provision, culpable breaches of control requirements and instructions, and according to case law does not require causation but suffices for a risk of harm.

Refusal of reasonable work under Art. 30 para. 1 lit. d UIA in conjunction with Art. 45 para. 3 lit. c and para. 4 lit. b UIO (31 to 60 suspension days) presupposes that the insured person is offered a concrete reasonable position within the meaning of Art. 16 UIA. Reasonableness must in principle be examined before the sanction is imposed. Although case law interprets the provision broadly, it has so far always applied it with regard to a concrete, reasonable job offer.

In placement through placement agencies or temporary employment offices, a framework placement agreement is generally concluded first, which does not create an obligation to work. Mere registration with placement offices does not count as sufficient personal job search efforts, and placement efforts by the placement agency do not count as personal job search efforts of the insured person (Art. 26 para. 1 UIO). Extending the elements to contacts with a placement officer without a concrete offer finds no support in the statutory wording and would not be appropriate given the far-reaching sanction.

Art. 30 para. 1 lit. d UIA is also not satisfied as a catch-all provision. Although conduct…