Facts
The plaintiffs A. and B. as well as the defendant C. AG are owners of neighboring properties. To reach the main road to the south, the plaintiffs must cross the defendant's property. The legal predecessors of the parties had agreed on several pedestrian and vehicular easements, which they had registered as real easements in the land register. In a further contract from 1972, the owners granted each other a joint right of use for five parking spaces located on the common boundary of the two properties. The contract stipulated that these parking spaces may not be used during the business hours of company D. AG.Considerations
The Federal Supreme Court ruled that the temporal restriction on the use of the parking spaces pursuant to Article 4 Paragraph 2 of the 1972 easement contract is a provision of an obligatory and not a real nature. The clear wording of the contractual provision, the contractual context, and the interests of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract show that the owners and easement holders only wanted to commit themselves personally towards company D. AG, but not towards each other. Since company D. AG has ceased its business activities, the temporal restriction on the use of the parking spaces has lapsed, and the "right of joint use of…