Facts
The parties, [A.A.] (appellant, wife) and [B.A.] (respondent, husband), married in 1999 in Lucerne and are the parents of two sons (born 2006 and 2008). They separated on 1 January 2014. By decision of 28 September 2015, the Kriens District Court regulated custody of the children with the mother, the assignment of the marital property to the wife, the vehicle to the husband, and maintenance contributions. The Lucerne Cantonal Court newly set the contributions by decision of 28 July 2016. The Federal Supreme Court upheld the wife's appeal for violation of the right to be heard and remanded the matter; the husband's appeal was written off as moot (judgment 5A_645/2016, 5A_651/2016 of 18 May 2017).
On 2 January 2016, the husband filed a divorce action under Art. 114 CC. On 28 November 2019, he applied for a partial judgment on the divorce issue. The wife opposed this application, but not the divorce itself. The District Court dismissed the application on 7 February 2020.
On the husband's appeal, the Lucerne Cantonal Court, 2nd Division, by decision of 10 July 2020, dissolved the marriage and thereby issued a partial judgment on the divorce issue. The Cantonal Court relied on BGE 144 III 298 and judgment 5A_426/2018. It held that the divorce ground was liquid, that the parties had lived apart for over six years, that the divorce proceedings were being conducted in an entrenched manner, that the protection-of-marriage decisions had always been taken to the Federal Supreme Court, and that the husband had initiated a (discontinued) criminal proceeding against the wife. The wife had massively insulted the husband, which is why mutual respect had disappeared. Her interest in remaining a statutory heir did not outweigh the husband's interest in estate planning. Moreover, the maintenance obligation towards the children is independent of the date of divorce.
By civil law appeal of 25 August 2020, the wife applied for the cantonal decision to be set aside and the partial judgment application to be dismissed, with costs and compensation at the expense of the other party. She alleged a violation of Art. 283 CPC. No responses were requested.
Considerations
The appeal is directed against a final cantonal partial decision on the divorce issue (Art. 75, Art. 91 let. a FSCA), which concerns a non-pecuniary civil matter (Art. 72 para. 1 FSCA). The appellant has standing (Art. 76 para. 1 FSCA) and the time limit has been observed. The appeal is in principle admissible. The Federal Supreme Court only reviews complaints that have been clearly and specifically raised; the strict complaint principle applies (Art. 106 para. 2 FSCA), and findings of fact may only be corrected if arbitrary (Art. 105 para. 1 FSCA).
Under Art. 283 para. 1 CPC, the principle of the unity of the divorce judgment applies. According to BGE 144 III 298, this principle does not preclude a partial decision on the divorce issue if both spouses consent or if one spouse's interest in a partial judgment outweighs the other's interest in a simultaneous decision. In doing so, the following must be considered in particular: information rights, the matrimonial property settlement, pension benefit sharing, post-divorce maintenance, parental rights, the right to remarry, the liquidity of the divorce ground, and the duration of the proceedings. What matters is the actual duration of the proceedings, not the procedural management, whereby a forecast of the future duration must be made. In judgment 5A_426/2018, the heirship status of the objecting spouse was assessed: the statutory right of inheritance is grounded in the marital union; once that union is no longer lived, invoking it constitutes an abuse of rights (Art. 2 para. 2 CC).
The decision on whether to issue a partial decision is a discretionary decision of the trial court. The Federal Supreme Court reviews it freely, but only intervenes if the discretion has been abused, by departing without reason from recognised principles, taking into account impermissible considerations, or disregarding relevant circumstances, or if the result is manifestly unjust (BGE 142 III 617 consid. 3.2.5, 612 consid. 4.5).
The appellant argues that case law requires a predominant interest of the petitioning spouse, but that the heirship status is a…