Facts

[A. AG] is the debtor in the enforcement proceedings for real estate enforcement Nos. xxxx and yyyy of the enforcement office [F.] . After the enforcement office had announced the valuation of the two affected properties on January 19, 2011, the debtor requested a new valuation from the District Court [G.] as the lower supervisory authority in the sense of Art. 99 para. 2 in conjunction with Art. 9 para. 2 FSREO, which was ordered on February 15, 2011.

The debtor considered the expert to be biased, whereupon a new expert was proposed on September 12, 2011. This expert was also rejected as biased, but was nevertheless appointed by the District Court on September 28, 2011. The debtor appealed against this decision up to the Federal Court, which referred the matter back to the Higher Court as the higher supervisory authority for further clarification of the facts and a new assessment with its judgment of April 3, 2012 (5A_864/2011).

Subsequently, the District Court [G.] appointed a new expert in the person of [H.] on August 30, 2012. The debtor again appealed against this decision, which was dismissed by the Higher Court with its judgment of October 9, 2012.

Against this judgment, [A. AG] filed an appeal in civil matters on October 29, 2012, combined with the requests for its annulment and preparation of a new valuation in a fair procedure, namely with a written inquiry, including the experts of Bank [I.] and Bank [J.] , and with a reduction of the advance payment of costs from CHF 8,000 to a maximum of CHF 4,000.

Considerations

The Federal Court has dismissed the appeal in civil matters, insofar as it can be considered. The court costs are therefore to be borne by the appellant (Art. 66 para. 1 FSCA). The opposing party has not incurred any compensable expenses.

The Higher Court has referred to Art. 183 CPC/CH for the obligation to recuse oneself of the appointed real estate appraiser, based on § 18 EG DEBA/ZH and § 83 para. 3 GOG/ZH. However, the appellant does not raise any corresponding objections, and the question is ultimately not decisive either, because the same answers result from both recusal rules and also from the constitutional minimum requirements applicable to experts according to Art. 29 para. 1 Cst.

The appellant was already informed with the judgment 5A_864/2011 in E. 4.1 that the District Court was not obliged to invite her to submit expert proposals. All the more, she does not have a actual right to propose experts that would be binding for the court; rather, the selection or designation of the expert lies within the competence of the authority ordering the expert opinion.

The…